MYANMAR’S GENOCIDE AND THE LEGACY OF FORGETTING
Catherine Renshaw*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION: AUNG SAN AND THE LEGACY OF FORGETTING ..... 426

II.

TRANSITION WITHOUT JUSTICE ...................................................... 437
A. Ethnic Conflict and Military Rule ..................................... 437
B. The Shadow of the 1990 Elections .................................... 442
C. Setting the Junta Free........................................................ 443

III.

TIME, SUFFERING, AND MEMORY.................................................... 445
A. Buddhism and Transitional Justice ................................... 445
B. Truth .................................................................................. 448
C. Burmese Exceptionalism ................................................... 449

IV.

THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ............................ 450
A. The Rule of Law in Myanmar ............................................ 450
B. The Rule of Law During Transition .................................. 452

V.

THE ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR: BEYOND THE LAW ........................ 458
A. The Rohingya as Outsiders................................................ 458
B. Citizenship and the 2008 Constitution .............................. 463
C. The Path to Genocide ........................................................ 465

VI.

CONCLUSION: THE CALL TO MEMORY ............................................ 470

*
Catherine Renshaw, PhD University of Sydney, LLM University of Sydney, LLB University of New South Wales, BA(Hons) University of Sydney, is Professor of Law at Western Sydney University. The author acknowledges the excellent research assistance of Mr
Dane Burge.

425

426

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:425

I. INTRODUCTION: AUNG SAN AND THE LEGACY OF FORGETTING
In the dying days of the British Empire, after the Second World War, the
Governor of Burma faced the problem of what to do about a young Burmese
lieutenant called Aung San. Early in the war, Aung San led the Burma Independence Army (BIA), fighting on the side of the Japanese Imperial Army to
drive the British from Burma.1 When the tide of war turned against the Japanese, Aung San joined the British forces, contributing to the success of the
Allied military strategy in the Far East.2 After the war, as leader of the AntiFascist People’s Freedom League, Aung San negotiated with the British to
achieve Burmese independence.3 To the British, Aung San was a powerful
political actor and the key to ensuring that Burma transitioned peacefully from
British colony to loyal member of the Commonwealth.4
Aung San was also, in likelihood, a war criminal. In 1942, he killed a local
Muslim headman, Abdul Rashid, who had been appointed by the British to
manage a village on the country’s southern coast.5 Rashid’s widow and several eyewitnesses claimed that Aung San threw Rashid into a locked cart with
a pig and starved him for eight days,6 before crucifying him to a goalpost in a
public stadium and bayoneting him to death.7 Aung San did not deny that he
had carried out the killing, but he claimed that it had taken place after a court

1
Nicholas Tarling, Lord Mountbatten and the Return of Civil Government to Burma,
11 J. IMP. COMMONW. HIST. 197, 197–99 (1983). In 1988, the government changed the
English-language name of the country from “Burma” to “Myanmar.” Throughout this Article, I use “Burma” when referring to events before 1988, and “Myanmar” for the post–
1988 period. This usage reflects accepted academic practice in Burmese Studies. See
CATHERINE RENSHAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PARTICIPATORY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(2019).
2
See AUNG SAN SUU KYI, My Father, in FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER WRITINGS
22 (Michael Aris ed., 1991) [hereinafter FREEDOM FROM FEAR].
3
S. R. Ashton, Burma, Britain, and the Commonwealth, 1946–56, 29 J. IMP.
COMMONW. HIST. 65, 68 (2001).
4
See Hugh Tinker, Burma’s Struggle for Independence: The Transfer of Power Thesis
Re-Examined, 20 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 461, 462 (1986); J. S. Furnivall, Twilight in Burma:
Reconquest and Crisis, 22 PAC. AFF. 3 (1949); Hugh Tinker, Burma: Power Transferred
or Exacted? Reflections on the Constitutional Process, in BRITISH POLICY AND THE
TRANSFER OF POWER IN ASIA: DOCUMENTARY PERSPECTIVES 24 (R.B. Smith & A.J. Stockwell eds., 1987).
5
CHRISTOPHER BAYLY & TIM HARPER, FORGOTTEN WARS: THE END OF BRITAIN’S
ASIAN EMPIRE 378 (2008).
6
Id. at 382.
7
The Humble Petition of Ma Ahma, Wife of the Late Abdul Raschid, Residing at
Paung, No. 452 IOR: M/5/102 (Apr. 8, 1946), in HUGH TINKER ET AL., BURMA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1944–1948: DOCUMENTS FROM OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE
SOURCES 728 (1983) [hereinafter BSI].
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martial that found Rashid guilty of pro-British activities, cruelty and corruption.8 On Aung San’s account, the context of the killing was the mass looting
and murder which accompanied the BIA’s entry into southern Burma in 1942
and that in any regard, “in such slave countries as Burma, it cannot be said
that conformity with the law is justice.”9 Aung San declared that his conscience was clear: “To confess the truth, however, though this measure is not
at all regular, yet it was rough and ready justice to suit the time and the conditions prevailing in the country.”10
The prevailing conditions included violent reprisals by Aung San’s BIA
against largely Christian ethnic groups who remained loyal to the British, such
as the Chin, Kachin and Karen minorities.11 In September 1945, for example,
a group of Karen leaders wrote to Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India
and Burma, detailing what the Karen had suffered at the hands of the BIA:
While Burma was under the military administration of the
Burma Independent Army . . . they branded the Karens as rebels, and persecuted and tortured them in all possible ways and
in certain districts resorted to wholesale massacre, not even
leaving babies, and set the Karen villages on fire. In
Myaungmya District alone, the Official Report reveals that
about 400 villages were set on fire in this way, and more than
1,800 Karens were slaughtered . . . Karens of the Salween Hill
District, Papun, fared worse. All of the leading men were
slaughtered, and their wives and daughters before being massacred were subjected to a moral degradation in the presence
of their husbands and fathers . . . At that time no influential
Burmese leader raised his hand and called a halt to such senseless massacre. Were it not for the timely intervention of the
Nippon Imperial Armies, we could not imagine how far the
matter would have gone.12
The British vacillated on whether to prosecute Aung San. Originally, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander South East Asia Command,
8
Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7, 1946), No. 451 IOR:
M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726; see also FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 26.
9
Aung San’s rejoinder to the charges in the Legislative Council was printed in the Hanthawaddy newspaper. Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7,
1946), No. 451 IOR: M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726 c. (Apr. 4, 1946); see BAYLY &
HARPER, supra note 5, at 381–84.
10
Translation of Extract from Hanthawaddy Newspaper (Apr. 7, 1946), No. 451 IOR:
M/5/112, in BSI, supra note 7, at 726.
11
See PAUL H. KRATOSKA, The Karen of Burma Under Japanese Rule, in SOUTHEAST
ASIAN MINORITIES IN THE WARTIME JAPANESE EMPIRE 27 (Paul H. Kratoska ed., 2002).
12
The Humble Memorial of the Karens of Burma to His Britannic Majesty’s Secretary
of State for Burma, No. 286 IOR: M/4/3023 (Sept. 26, 1945), in BSI, supra note 7, at 494.
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was entirely opposed to any general amnesty for the BIA: “They must be told
that their present actions were appreciated but that their past offenses have not
been forgotten.”13 Governor Dorian Smith regarded the prosecution of Aung
San as a test of the government’s willingness to allow the law to take its
course: “[n]ot to act was to impugn the law and bring it into contempt.”14
Deputy Governor John Wise noted that others had been hanged for similar
offenses and thought it “deplorable” that Aung San’s status would exempt
him.15 By 1946, however, the views of the British had evolved. Mountbatten
wrote:
Aung San’s antics may be disturbing, but there is no doubt in
my mind that he played the game by me . . . He is bound to be
a leading figure for some years to come . . . . We would do
better to concentrate on showing him and his friends the paths
in which we think the true future of Burma lies.16
Mountbatten advised the Governor that to arrest Aung San would be “the
greatest disservice which could be done towards the future of Burma within
the British Empire” and to bring Aung San to trial for what was essentially an
act of wartime justice, when cooperation with Aung San’s forces was proving
so effective, would be a “gross act of disloyalty.”17 Mountbatten noted that
the murder of Rashid “appears to have occurred during the period immediately
following our retreat; in the heat of the moment, and in the unsettled conditions which must have existed, it was only to be expected, I suppose, that
summary justice would rule, and that old scores would be paid off.”18
Eventually, realpolitik prevailed. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Dorian
Smith wrote of a “new approach” to Aung San. He suggested that rather than
prosecute, the British should adopt a Burmese characteristic trait “to forgive
and forget.”19 In 1946 the British parliament passed the War-Time Crimes
(Exemption) Act 1946 (Burma Act No. XLVII of 1946).20 The Act did not
13

Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia SAC (Misc.) 5th Meeting, 27 March, 1945, No. 107 PRO: WO 203/4404, in BSI, supra note 7, at 196.
14
Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith to Arthur Henderson, No. 464 IOR: M/5/102 (Apr. 26,
1946), in BSI, supra note 7, at 743.
15
Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House, Rangoon, on 27 March 1946, No.
435 IOR: M/5/102, in BSI, supra note 7, at 704.
16
Letter from Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia to Governor of Burma
(Mar. 26, 1946), Document 431, in BSI, supra note 7, at 698.
17
William Crawley, Britain in Burma: The Last Act, 16 ASIAN AFF. 308, 310 (1985).
18
Lieutenant General G. W. Symes to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, in BSI, supra note
7, at 543.
19
Letter from Dorman-Smith to Clement Attlee (May 7, 1946), Document 490, in BSI,
supra note 7, at 773.
20
Robert Cribb, Burma Trials of Japanese War Criminals 1946–1947, in WAR CRIMES
TRIALS IN THE WAKE OF DECOLONIZATION AND COLD WAR IN ASIA, 1945–1956: JUSTICE IN
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provide a pardon for Aung San and his soldiers for their treason or wartime
atrocities, nor did it grant a general amnesty. It simply required the Governor’s
consent before a court could accept a criminal case involving offenses committed in Burma from December 8, 1941 to May 5, 1945. After the war, the
British held a relatively small number of war crimes trials in Burma to prosecute Japanese officers,21 but in delicate matters such as that of Aung San, cases
were permitted to languish and fade away. With Burma’s independence, a line
was drawn under the crimes of the Second World War.
Aung San is Myanmar’s most important political symbol.22 To the Burmese, he is the father of independence.23 Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of
Aung San, describes her father as “the man who had come in their hour of
need to restore their national pride and honour [sic]”24 and calls his memory
“a reservoir of national strength and pride.”25 Aung San is revered not only
for his heroism on the battlefield and for negotiating Burma’s exit from the
British Empire, but also for uniting the country’s deeply divided and heavily
armed ethnic armies at the end of the Second World War.26 The assassination
of Aung San in 1947 is regarded as a national tragedy that deformed the shape
TIME OF TURMOIL 130 (Kerstin von Lingen ed., 2016) (citing War-Time Crimes (Exemption) Act 1946 (Burma Act No. XLVII of 1946)).
21
Id. at 133–34 (“The first British war crimes trial in Rangoon, which opened in March
1946, prosecuted 13 Japanese soldiers and their commander, Major Ichikawa Seigi, on
charges of carrying out at massacre at Kalagon, a predominantly Muslim village near
Moulmein. An estimated 600 villagers were killed on 7 July 1945 because some of them
had collaborated with British special forces operating in the region behind Japanese
lines.”).
22
Josef Silverstein, The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political Thought of Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, 69 PAC. AFF. 211 (1996).
23
Matthew J. Walton, Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of
Panglong, 48 ASIAN SURV. 889 (2008); Tin Maung Maung Than, The Essential Tension:
Democratization and the Unitary State in Myanmar (Burma), 12 SOUTH EAST ASIAN RES.
187 (2004); LIAN H. SAKHONG, IN SEARCH OF CHIN IDENTITY: A STUDY IN RELIGION,
POLITICS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN BURMA 208–210 (2003); FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra
note 2, at 3–38.
24
FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 37.
25
Aung San Suu Kyi, The True Meaning of BOH, 31 ASIAN SURV. 793 (1991); FREEDOM
FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 191.
26
At that conference, the country’s leaders agreed to shape their new democracy as a
federal union that respected the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Alan Smith,
Burma/Myanmar: The Struggle for Democracy and Ethnic Rights, in MULTICULTURALISM
IN ASIA 268 (Will Kymlicka & Baogang He eds., 2005); MARTIN SMITH, BURMA:
INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 78–89 (1991); KYAW YIN, UNFORGETTABLE
SPEECHES OF BOGYOKE AUNG SAN 115 (1969); see The Constitution of the Union of Burma,
with amendments, in TIN MAUNG MAUNG, BURMA’S CONSTITUTION (1959); E Burke Inlow,
The Constitution of Burma, 17 FAR EASTERN SURV. 257, 264–67 (1948); Benegal Narsing
Rau, The Constitution of Burma, 23 J. WASH. L. REV. 288 (1948); David I. Steinberg, Myanmar’s Perpetual Dilemma: Ethnicity in a “Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” (East
West Ctr., Working Paper No. 22, 2011), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private
/pswp022.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32834.
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of Burmese history and led to half a century of civil war and authoritarian
rule.27 In Yangon today, Aung San’s family home—where Aung San Suu Kyi
spent some of her childhood—is preserved as a museum. The artifacts of
Aung San’s life depict the young general as a simple, modest, thoughtful man,
driven by a fierce desire for freedom. On the walls of the museum are descriptions of Aung San’s bravery on the battlefield and his cunning as a statesman.
There are no references to the brutality of events that led up to Burmese independence. The murder of Rashid is not registered—it is an occlusion in the
fabric of social memory.
The killing of Abdul Rashid took place in circumstances of anarchy and
the suspension of ordinary rule under the tide of conflict. At different periods
in modern Burmese history these circumstances have reoccurred in northwest
Myanmar.28 Freed from the constraints of civil law, the military has perpetrated atrocities against the country’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya.29 Bloodlands is the name given by one author to the ungoverned spaces
in Poland which became sites for genocide during the Second World War.30
The name is apposite for some of Myanmar’s outlier states, where the central
civilian authority exercises incomplete power, where powerful ethnic armies
vie for control of parts of the state, and where minority groups such as the
Rohingya, without citizenship, suffer at the hands of both. The lesson of history, it seems, is that in places such as these things happen for which historical
justice is not possible, and that afterwards, political pragmatism and public
forgetting is an appropriate response.

27

Aung San Suu Kyi dedicated her book Freedom from Fear and Other Writings to the
memory of her father. FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at v (“When I honour my father,
I honour all those who stand for political integrity in Burma.”).
28
Maung Zarni & Alice Cawley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya,
23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014).
29
In this Article, I focus on the Rohingya. However, as the UN International Fact Finding Mission made clear in its report of September 2018, Myanmar’s military have also
carried out crimes against humanity and war crimes against other ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Kachin, Karen, and Shan peoples, in the period since the end of the
Second World War. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64
(Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter IFFM 2018]; and UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN
Doc A/HRC/42/50 (Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter IFFM 2019].
30
TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 6 (2012).
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Sceptics of transitional justice caution against extravagant claims about
what can be achieved by trials or truth commissions in the aftermath of administrative massacre.31 Sceptics argue that institutions and processes of transitional justice can impede political settlements necessary for peace32; that
they do not produce reliable historical records about the context of international crimes33; that they do not provide all victims with a voice, healing or
closure34; that there is scant evidence they deter future leaders from committing other atrocities35; and that there is no convincing causal link between
criminal trials in transitional contexts and the rule of law, democratic consolidation, or the advancement of liberal values.36 Sceptics would argue that the
British were right to stay the hand of justice in the case of Aung San.
The trial of Aung San for the murder of Rashid, had it taken place, would
probably not have bought comfort to Rashid’s widow or dissuaded General
Ne Win from violating the constitution and orchestrating a military coup fourteen years later. The trial’s legitimacy, as a process established by Burma’s
colonial rulers against one of the country’s war heroes, would almost certainly
have been impugned. Public sentiment would have run with Aung San: the
argument that his cause was just and that his actions were extenuated by the
larger historical context would have been very well received by key sections
of the public.37
When juxtaposed with the pragmatic arguments of sceptics, the arguments
marshalled by proponents for transitional justice can appear comparatively
vague and difficult to support with empirical evidence. Professor Mark Osiel,
for example, argues that criminal trials have utility because of their potential
to uncover complex histories and explain the motivations of individuals involved, and in the process of legal argument and counter-argument there is

31
Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 463, 468 (1995) (“Administrative massacre” is the phrase used by Mark Osiel
to mean “large scale violation of basic human rights to life and liberty by the central state
in a systematic and organized fashion, often agaimst its own citizens, generally in a climate
of war – civil or international, real or imagined.”).
32
Nick Grono & Adam O’Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes, in
COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13–20 (Nicholas Waddell &
Phil Clark eds., 2008).
33
Anna Bryson, Victims, Violence, and Voice: Transitional Justice, Oral History, and
Dealing with the Past, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 299 (2016).
34
Anna Macdonald, From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us About Local
Experiences of Transitional Justice?, 1 TRANSITIONAL J. REV. 72 (2015).
35
Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the
Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 434 (2013).
36
Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron and Roland Paris, State-Level Effects of Transitional
Justice: What Do We Know?, 4(3) INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL J. 1 (2010).
37
More than 500 people watched Rashid’s murder, yet the British could find only five
witnesses—all Indians—who were prepared to give evidence against him. See Lieutenant
General G. W. Symes to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, in BSI, supra note 7, at 543.
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potential for awakening or deepening the kind of inter-personal understanding
that is fundamental to a tolerant society.38 Osiel argues that at the societal
level, post-conflict trials are forums where debate concerning basic understandings about the relationship between the individual and the state can be
rehearsed and reflected upon. In circumstances where “the need for a new
beginning is widely felt, the very process of critical reassessment—to which
the dramatic power of liberal show trials can contribute—may itself be symbolically treated (and later commemorated) as a decisive moment of collective
refounding.”39 Scholars like Osiel might argue that the trial of Aung San and
the publicity, public debate, and historical record that it left, would have raised
questions about the moral complexity of Aung San’s act, about political violence, about the virtues of civil tolerance; and about the equal moral worth of
all individuals, including those who, like Rashid, were outsiders or “others”
to society. These questions, simmering in political consciousness over a long
period of time, might have contributed to creating a political culture that was
more sensitive to the perspectives and experiences of minorities.
In this article I examine Myanmar’s troubled transition towards a limited
form of constitutional democracy in the period 2008–2018 as a case study of
what can happen when “forgetting” is adopted as a political response to atrocity. Before 2008, in the decades that followed independence from Britain,
Burma experienced the collapse of democracy, single party rule, and military
dictatorship. During the periods of military governance, the country’s people
experienced the massive and grave violations of human rights that accompany
rule by fiat. Compounding the suffering was ongoing civil war between the
armed forces of the central government, the Tatmadaw, and ethnic minority
armies in the borderlands. In relation to the country’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya, there was widespread public antipathy. The causes of
animosity were various: historical enmity associated with the colonial period;
religious prejudice against Muslims among the country’s deeply Buddhist majority; perceptions that Muslims contributed to economic scarcity. At the public policy level, prejudice manifested in the 1982 Citizenship Law, which restricted the right of Rohingya to claim citizenship;40 in public discourse which
labelled the Rohingya as outsiders and “others;” and in periodic efforts to
drive the Rohingya over the border to Bangladesh through military operations
which aimed to clear Rohingya villages of insurgents.
In 2008, the country began a transition from military rule toward a limited
form of constitutional democracy.41 The transition was engineered by the mil-

38
Osiel, supra note 31, at 493 (“Through this process,” writes Osiel, “dangerous misconceptions about ‘the other’ can be overcome.”).
39
Id. at 481.
40
See 1982 Citizenship Law (Myan.).
41
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime
Survives in an Age of Democratization, 22 PAC. REV. 271 (2009); Ashley South, Political
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itary itself and eventually supported by the country’s main democratic political party, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi.42
Transition took place without national measures to deal with the legacy of
massive human rights abuses—without criminal prosecutions, truth-telling, or
reparations.43 There appeared to be sound practical reasons for this. The military was in control of the transition: threatening it would destabilize the political situation and risk a coup d’état.44 In many parts of the country, civil war
and accompanying violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law continued; amassing evidence of what happened in
the past was problematic while conflict was ongoing.45 Myanmar’s legal system was overburdened and its judges ill-equipped to deal with dispensing ordinary justice: the vast and complex caseload that would result from efforts to
address historical justice was beyond its capacity.46 The country’s complex
history was dark and tangled: Myanmar was not the first country to move towards the future by drawing a line under the past.47 To a significant extent,
the United Nations and key members of the international community, including the United States and Great Britain, supported the pursuit of demi-democratization without accountability.48 In the early years of the transition, long-

Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization, 26(2) CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST
ASIA 233, 234 (2004); Khin Zaw Win, 2010 and the Unfinished Task of Nation-Building,
in RULING MYANMAR: FROM CYCLONE NARGIS TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS 19–31(Nick
Cheesman et al. eds., 2010); Yash Ghai, The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and
Assessment, BURMA LIBRARY (2008); Nick Cheesman, Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of
Law in Myanmar, 82 PAC. AFF. 597, 599 (2009).
42
Hlaing, supra note 41, at 288.
43
Ben Rhodes, What Happened to Aung San Suu Kyi?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2019), https
://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/what-happened-to-aung-san-suu-kyi/5
94781/.
44
Id.
45
Rhodes, supra note 43.
46
Cheesman, supra note 41.
47
Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Transitional Justice Versus Traditional Justice: The Basque
Case, 12 JEMIE 30, 33 (2013); Landon E. Hancock, The Northern Irish Peace Process:
From Top to Bottom, 10 INT’L STUD. REV. 203 (2008); Amaia Alvarez Berastegi, Transitional Justice in Settled Democracies: Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in Comparative Perspective, 10 CRITICAL STUD. ON TERRORISM 542 (2017); Patricia Lundy, Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the “Local” Level: Historical Enquiries
in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 89 (2011); Andrew Rigby, Amnesty and Amnesia in Spain, 12 PEACE REV. 73 (2000); Shane Alcobia-Murphy, Lest We Forget: Memory,
Trauma, and Culture in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland, 39 CANADIAN J. IRISH STUD. 82
(2016).
48
Jonathan T. Chow & Leif-Eric Easley, Myanmar’s Democratic Backsliding in the
Struggle for National Identity and Independence, ASAN FORUM (June 25, 2019), http://ww
w.theasanforum.org/myanmars-democratic-backsliding-in-the-struggle-for-national-ident
ity-and-independence/.
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standing sanctions against Myanmar were lifted,49 and the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar suspended
calls for the establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry into crimes against
humanity carried out by the military.50
Instead of establishing institutions to pursue historical justice, the architects of Myanmar’s transition sought to transform political culture, foster civic
trust and signal an end to impunity and arbitrary rule by gradually strengthening the rule of law. The hope was that acts of contemporary justice would
ground the belief that norms associated with democratic governance now
played a meaningful role in guiding the behaviour of power-holders. The new
government established institutions (a Human Rights Commission, a Rule of
Law Committee, an Electoral Commission) and prosecuted some members of
the military who carried out extra-judicial killings.51 In relation to the circumstances of the Rohingya, however, transition presaged little change.52 The
1982 Citizenship Law was not amended, and in the general elections of 2015,
the National League for Democracy did not field a single Muslim candidate.53
In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi’s long-time friend and legal adviser, the Muslim
constitutional lawyer U Ko Ni, was assassinated.54 Suu Kyi did not attend his
funeral nor, in the immediate aftermath of the incident, did she make any public comment in relation to his murder.55 Finally, in 2016 and 2017, in response
to attacks by a Muslim terrorist organization on several border guard posts in

49
Catherine Renshaw, Top-Down Transitions and the Politics of US Sanctions, in THE
BUSINESS OF TRANSITION: LAW REFORM, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMICS IN MYANMAR 228
(2017).
50
Reports calling for the Commission of Inquiry include: UN Human Rights Council,
Tomás Ojea Quintana (Special Rapportur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar),
Progress Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,
¶122, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/48 (Mar. 10, 2010) (“United Nations institutions may consider
the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding mandate to
address the question of international crimes”); UN Human Rights Council, Tomás Ojea
Quintana (Special Rapportur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶¶ 68–72, U.N. Doc.
A/65/368 (Sept. 15, 2010).
51
Niki Esse de Lang, The Establishment and Development of the Myanmar National
Human Rights Commission and Its Conformity with International Standards, 13 ASIA-PAC.
J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 1 (2012).
52
Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://ww
w.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar.
53
Discrimination in Arkan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/
burma/burm005-02.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
54
Tom Lasseter, In a Muslim Lawyer’s Murder, Myanmar’s Shattered Dream, REUTERS
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-murder-po
litics/.
55
Id.
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northwest Myanmar, the military orchestrated “clearance operations” that resulted in extreme violence against the Rohingya.56 750,000 Rohingya fled
across the border to Bangladesh.57 Across Myanmar, thousands of people
marched in the streets in support of the military’s actions.
In this article I explain why Myanmar’s political leaders eschewed recognizing or accounting for the injustices of the past and I argue that this failure
was one of the factors that made possible the genocide perpetrated on the
country’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya. I argue that after almost
half a century of military rule, political consciousness within Myanmar required radical readjustment; a dramatic shift in the contours of understanding
about the past and the appropriate relationship between the individual and the
state. The prosecution of one of the country’s generals for well-documented58
crimes against humanity might have achieved this, in the same way that the
prosecution of Aung San might have achieved it during the country’s transition from colonial rule. A trial would not necessarily have created an authoritative record of history from which lessons could be taken to build an imagined democratic future. But what it might have achieved—and what is still
urgently required—is the foundation for what Osiel describes as “the solidarity embodied in the increasingly respectful way that citizens can come to
acknowledge the differing views of their fellows.”59 What is required in Myanmar is broad public debate about the morality of the military’s actions during the years of dictatorship, wide-scale deliberative reflection about society’s
existing political culture, and a period of deep national self-examination about
the effects of long-term repression.60
It is a relatively straightforward matter to point to concrete examples of
cases where justice has been pursued in the wake of conflict and the result, for
individuals and societies, has fallen well short of the promise. It is a more
56
Stephanie Nebehay, Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Rohingya
Return: U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohi
ngya-un/brutal-myanmar-army-operation-aimed-at-preventing-rohingya-return-u-n-idUS
KBN1CG10A.
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Ishaan Tharoor, The Rohingya Crisis Can’t Stay Bangladesh’s Burden, Prime Minister Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/3
0/rohingya-crisis-cant-stay-bangladeshs-problem-prime-minister-says/.
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There are many reports into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Myanmar. The report published by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law
School is an example of the careful reporting and analysis on Burma/Myanmar that universities, NGOs and various bodies within the United Nations have carried out. See THE
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., CRIMES IN BURMA 8 (2009).
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Osiel, supra note 31, at 478.
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Instead, in the decade following the 2010 elections, the words “transitional justice”
were taboo in Myanmar. A workshop I organized in 2016 in Kachin state with Professor
Adam Czarnota, titled “Justice During Times of Transition” was shut down half-way
through the first session on the orders of the Office of the State Prosecutor (Aung San Suu
Kyi’s office).
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uncertain and hazardous task to attempt to argue that the absence of justice
measures resulted in a political culture that is intolerant, illiberal, and prone
to political violence. It is doubly hazardous to make the attempt while events
are still unfolding and cannot yet be seen through the longer lens of history.
The simplest explanation for what happened to the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017
is that Myanmar’s military remained unconstrained by new democratic institutions and continued to set its own objectives, pursuing them with familiar
strategies of force and terror. What this article attempts to show is that in addition to this, at a deeper level, among a great majority of ordinary people,
there was continuity of the distrust, suspicion, and the malaise that afflicts
societies that have lived under terror and repression—a normality dominated
by personal and communal suffering, overladen with grief, fear, anger and
disregard for the rights of others and outsiders.61
In her 1991 essay “Freedom from Fear,” Aung San Suu Kyi wrote that the
“quintessential revolution is that of the spirit, born of an intellectual conviction of the need for change in those mental attitudes and values which shape
the course of a nation’s development.”62 By birthright and ambition, Aung
San Suu Kyi should have championed the “revolution of the spirit” that her
country needed. Suu Kyi possessed, in her own words, “a historical sense that
despite all setbacks the condition of man is set on an ultimate course for both
spiritual and material advancement.”63 Suu Kyi recognized that Burmese society was wracked by distrust and uncertainty and that saddha (confidence in
moral, spiritual and intellectual values)64 needed to be rebuilt, drawing on
what she describes as “the Burmese capacity for the sustained mental strife
and physical endurance necessary to withstand the forces of negativism, bigotry, and hate.”65 The impetus for struggle, according to Suu Kyi, is a genuine
respect for individual liberty, freedom, peace and justice.66 One of the tragedies of Myanmar is that Suu Kyi did not demonstrate this respect for the Rohingya when she was put to the test. She remained part of a political culture
where genocide of the country’s archetypal outsiders, the Rohingya, was possible.
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II. TRANSITION WITHOUT JUSTICE
A. Ethnic Conflict and Military Rule
Myanmar’s transition toward a limited form of constitutional democracy,
after two decades of direct military rule, began in 2008, with a successful referendum on the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.67
The Constitution preserves a key role for the military in the political life of
the state.68 Twenty five percent of members of the parliament in both chambers must be serving army officers appointed by the military commander-inchief.69 The commander-in-chief has a decisive say in the appointment of the
President and two vice-presidents;70 certain key cabinet positions (such as
67

Timeline: Myanmar’s Slow Road to a New Constitution, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2008), https
://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-elections-constitution/timeline-myanmars-slow-r
oad-to-a-new-constitution-idUSBKK26169420080209.
68
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May 29, 2008, art. 6 (stating
that the Union’s objectives are: “(a) non-disintegration of the Union; (b) non- disintegration
of National solidarity; (c) perpetuation of sovereignty; (d) flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system; (e) enhancing the eternal principles of Justice, Liberty and Equality in the Union and; (f) enabling the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the State”); see also Si Thu Aung, To
Service as Balancing Weight, N. LIGHT OF MYAN. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://burmalibrary.o
rg/docs4/NLM2008-03-21.pdf (Si Thu Aung argues that the presence of the military in
parliament serves as a “balancing weight”, or a system of checks and balances, within the
fledgling parliamentary democracy).
69
Under Chapter IV of the Constitution, in the states and divisions, as in the national
legislature, twenty-five percent of seats are reserved for the Tatmadaw. Thus, Military representatives occupy 110 seats in the 440-seat Pyithu Hluttaw, or lower house; fifty-six out
of 224 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw or upper house, and more than 200 seats in the fourteen
state and regional hluttaws. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May
29, 2008, art. 13, 14, 109, 141.
70
The President is elected by a meeting of the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw (both chambers of
parliament) meeting in plenary session after three candidates have been nominated by the
two chambers and the army members meeting separately. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE UNION OF MYAN., May, 29, 2008, art. 60. The Constitution provide exclusionary
provisions relating to the position of President and Vice-President: the President must be
at least forty-five years of age and born of parents who were both citizens, and must be
acquainted with the political, administrative, economic, and military affairs of the state. Id.
at art. 59. He or she must also have no allegiance to, citizenship of, or rights and privileges
availed by a foreign power, nor can his or her parents, spouse, children, or their spouses.
Id. In addition, like members of the Hluttaw, he or she has to have lived in Myanmar for
the previous twenty years unless abroad with government permission, free from convictions, of sound mind, not destitute, and not in receipt of support from foreign governments
or religious organizations. Id. The Presidential term of office is five years and he or she
may serve for only two terms. Id. at art. 61. The President can be impeached if charged by
twenty-five percent of either house of the Hluttaw. Id. at art. 71. For his removal, a twothirds vote is required. Reasons for impeachment include: high treason; breach of the provisions of the Constitution, misconduct; disqualification; inefficiency. Id.
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Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defence) are confined to active military
personnel;71 and the army is fiscally and administratively autonomous.72 During states of emergency, which are declared by the President, the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the Union are transferred to the Commanderin-Chief of the Defence Services.73 Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution provides immunity for members of the former military government in relation to
any act done in the execution of duty;74 the Defence Service has the right to
independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.75 In
the adjudication of military justice, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Defence Services is final and conclusive.76 Amendment of key provisions of the Constitution requires the support of more than 75 percent of members of parliament, followed by approval in a referendum.77 This means that
the support of the military is necessary in order to change the Constitution.
In 2010, the military withdrew from power to make way for elections and
a nominally civilian government. The leading democratic opposition party,
the National League for Democracy (NLD), boycotted the elections because
the party’s leader, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former political prisoner
Aung San Suu Kyi, was not permitted to stand for election.78 The election was
won by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
There was deep skepticism in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections
about whether the military intended to allow genuine democratic reform. But,
between 2010 and 2015, under President Thein Sein, the new government undertook a program of liberalisation, releasing political prisoners, legalizing
trade unions, allowing public political gatherings, easing press censorship,
and permitting the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools.79 The
government also accelerated efforts to end ongoing civil conflict with the
71
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Id. at art. 20(b).
76
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Myanmar Bars Suu Kyi’s Election Participation, CNN (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/10/myanmar.election.law/index.html (reporting that
electoral law prohibited Suu Kyi from standing for election because she had been convicted
of offences); see also Randy James, John Yettaw: Suu Kyi’s Unwelcome Visitor, TIME
(May 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1899769,00.html (reporting that one conviction related to an incident in which an American, John Yettaw,
swam across a lake and entered unexpectedly into Ms Suu Kyi’s house. Ms Suu Kyi was
charged with violating the terms of her house arrest (by permitting Yetttaw to stay for a
short period). She was convicted and sentenced to three years gaol, a sentence that was
later reduced to eighteen months home detention).
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Catherine Renshaw, Human Rights Under the New Regime, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND LEGAL CHANGE IN MYANMAR 215–34 (Andrew Harding & Khin Khin Oo eds., 2017).
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country’s many armed ethnic organizations, who had been struggling for independence or a greater degree of autonomy since the end of colonial rule.80
An editorial in the The New Light of Myanmar contrasted the “violent conflicts, protests and bloodshed” that have marked other countries’ transitions
to democracy, with Myanmar’s “rapid, peaceful transition with mutual understanding and trust and negotiations as directed by its former rulers.” The editorial asked: “Can there be a more efficient, correct way? Hence, the Myanmar
government can daringly disclose that there is no way to deviate from its democratic transition. The President and other responsible leaders have reassured
the international community that they will never turn back from the country’s
changes and reforms.”81
In 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest and in 2011 she
declared that she trusted President Thein Sein to further democratization.82
“The Lady”, as she is known within Myanmar, told foreign diplomats that she
is “confident about the future and optimistic about the possibility of genuine
change” and that “Thein Sein can be trusted, he is genuinely trying to reform
the country, and needs international support.”83 The new government’s
strongest claim to credibility—both internally and externally—was Aung San
Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform.84 In 2012, the
NLD contested seats in federal by-elections and Aung San Suu Kyi herself
80
The government signed an official ceasefire with the Shan State Army-South (SSASouth) at the end of 2011. Aung Naing Oo, “Give Peace in Burma a Chance”, IRRAWADDY
(Dec. 13, 2011). On January 12, 2012, the government signed a ceasefire with the 19member Karen National Union, to end hostilities between the military and the Karen National Liberation Army. Marte Nilsen, Will Democracy Bring Peace to Myanmar?, 16
INT’L AREA STUD. REV. 115 (2013). The government also continued negotiations with the
Chin National Front and, in 2015, the government signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight armed ethnic organizations, including the Arakan Army. Myanmar Signs
Historic Cease-Fire Deal with Eight Ethnic Armies, RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 15, 2015), http
s://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/deal-10152015175051.html. However, peace was
very uncertain. In Kachin state, in the country’s North, a ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army which had been in place since 1994 came to an end in 2011. Tin Maung
Maung Than, Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar
(Burma), in ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 65–108 (Kusuma Snitwongse & W.
Scott Thompson eds., 2005).
81
Yangyi Aung, A New Nation with New Strength, N. LIGHT OF MYAN. (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2012-01-04.pdf.
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83
Joshua Kurlantzick, Is Myanmar’s Reform Real?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/is-myanmars-reformreal/25 5386/.
84
Steven Lee Myers, In Myanmar, Government Reforms Win over Some Skeptics, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/asia/in-myanmar-gov
ernment-reforms-win-over- countrys-skeptics.html (Daw Cho ChoKyaw Nyein, opposition leader and former political prisoner, said that: “What has happened in these last few
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of what they were saying . . . . [N]ow I believe what is happening is for the good of the
people.”).
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was elected to parliament.85 In the general elections of 2015, the NLD swept
to power. Barred from becoming President by a special provision in the Constitution, Suu Kyi appointed herself Special Counsellor of State, a role which
she said was “above the President.”86
Myanmar’s transition is “liberation from above” or “regime-initiated liberalisation.”87 It is the result of a decision on the part of the military to withdraw from direct rule and affect an orderly transfer of power to a civilian government. From the military’s perspective, the success of transition depends on
preserving the constitutional guarantees about military autonomy and a role
for the military in the political life of the state, including a guarantee that there
would be no prosecution of military officers for crimes committed while the
military was in power. The military’s primary justification for a continuing
political role was ongoing civil conflict and the potential for the disintegration
of the Union.88 Praetorianism and the failure of representative democracy,
which are the themes of Myanmar’s post-colonial history, both derive from
the core problem of attaining national unity in the face of ethnic diversity.89
Burmese leaders trace the origins of disunity to British rule (1825–1948) and
to the British “divide and conquer” strategy, which (they claim) led to intractable divisions between Myanmar’s majority Buddhist Bamar population, and
ethnic minorities (the Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and
Mon peoples) who inhabit Myanmar’s outlier regions.90 Myanmar’s Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Khin Maung Win wrote in 2004:
Myanmar is a Union composed of more than one hundred different national races, each with its own culture and traditions.
85
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Politically, there cannot be lasting peace and stability in the
country without national unity. Unfortunately, the divide and
rule policy practiced by the British colonialists resulted in suspicion and discord among the national races. This subsequently led to armed insurgency that spread to various parts of
the country for decades. The question of achieving national
unity and bringing to an end the armed insurgency are vital
issues for any government, past, present and future.91
While there was a prospect that conflict could lead to the secession of some
ethnic states, the military would preserve its political independence and power
to ensure the country remained unified. During the decades of military rule,
the imperative of maintaining unity justified extreme military tactics, including the abuse of civilians. Military operations under General Ne Win, for example, who ruled Burma from 1962–1988, were based on the “Four Cuts”
strategy, Pya Ley Pya, designed to cut the main links (food, funds, intelligence, recruits) between insurgents, their families and local villagers.92 The
British had used a similar strategy to defeat the communist insurgency in Malaysia after the Second World War and the United States used a similar strategy in the Second Vietnam War. The terrorization of local civilian populations
was an inherent part of the strategy: abuse of civilian’s human rights was essential to its success. Operations designed to clear areas of insurgents were
cordoned off; villagers were ordered to move to new military-controlled locations and villagers who remained were treated as insurgents and risked being
shot on sight.93 The military then confiscated food and destroyed crops.94
From 1992, successive United Nations Special Rapporteurs, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights and domestic and international nongovernmental organizations reported on war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out in pursuit of Tatmadaw suppression of ethnic insurgencies.95
91
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The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 2015 by the government
and representatives of some ethnic insurgent groups, did not include provisions for the establishment of criminal proceedings in relation to crimes committed by the military (or crimes committed by ethnic armies); nor did it refer
to the establishment of truth commissions; nor to reparations.96 It did, however, refer to the pursuit of social and economic goals: protecting the environment, improvements to health and education, and addressing the chronic drug
problem that exists in many ethnic states.97 The view shared by many among
the military, leaders of ethnic armies, and the NLD, was that focusing on retribution—or even calling for recognition of the crimes committed by the former military regime through the establishment of a truth commission—would
destabilize the political situation and undermine prospects for democratic consolidation and peace.98 Renowned Myanmar scholar Dr. Tim Maung Maung
Than said, “There are certain red lines in Myanmar for the military. Transitional justice is one of the red lines.”99
B. The Shadow of the 1990 Elections
There was a clear historical precedent for what might happen if the democratic opposition crossed the red line. In general elections held in 1990, the
NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a sweeping victory, securing more than
50% of the popular vote. The military, however, refused to transfer power to
the NLD. The reason for this—in popular legend at least—was an offhand
comment from U Kyi Maung, chairman of the NLD, who in a post-election
press conference referred to “Nuremberg-style tribunals” while explaining to
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/64 (Apr. 2, 2014); The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 1, 1996), https:/
/hrw.org/report/1996/09/01/rohingya-muslims-ending-cycle-exodus; AMNESTY INT’L,
MYANMAR/BANGLADESH: ROHINGYAS –THE SEARCH FOR SAFETY (1997), https://www.ref
world.org/docid/3ae6a9931f.html; AMNESTY INT’L, MYAN. (BURMA): CONTINUING
KILLINGS AND ILL-TREATMENT OF MINORITY PEOPLES (1991), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/documents/ASA16/005/1991/en/; AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: “NO LAW AT ALL”:
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a foreign journalist that the NLD did not intend to seek accountability for what
the army had done to the people during its period of rule. “Here in Burma,”
said Kyi Maung, “we do not need any Nuremberg-style tribunals.”100 Many
people in Myanmar believe that one of the primary reasons why the Burmese
military refused to relinquish power after the 1990 elections was because the
generals feared they would be tried for crimes committed during the period of
dictatorship.101 A quarter of a century after their first abortive attempt to take
power, the NLD was determined to ensure that history would not repeat itself
and that the generals would not once again be frightened into retreating from
reform.102 Through public statements and gestures of support for the
Tatmadaw, Aung San Suu Kyi continually reassured the military that the NLD
would not seek retribution for acts committed during the years of military
rule.103 When she discussed mechanisms for accountability, which was rarely
and reluctantly, it was in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission,
similar to the South African commission, which might be established at some
distant point in the future.104 Suu Kyi said that she followed in the footsteps
of leaders such as Desmond Tutu, who preached forgiveness and reconciliation rather than vengeance and retribution: “Whoever [committed wrongs],
we will show them how forgiving we are. No one needs to be afraid of the
NLD forming government. We have no plan to seek revenge.”105 After 2012,
Suu Kyi pointedly embraced the Tatmadaw as “her father’s army” and declared that she was “very fond” of the army.106 She asked the people to reconcile with the military and move forward hand-in-hand.107
C. Setting the Junta Free
Suu Kyi’s views on non-retribution were in line with those of her colleague
and mentor U Tin Oo, who founded the NLD with Suu Kyi in 1988 and who
100
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was at various points in time the party’s Vice President and President. Tin Oo
said:
Our policy from the beginning was to renounce violence or
any armed struggle as an instrument of policy . . . if we are
burning for some sort of revenge, we will achieve nothing. The
people will only say that the NLD is the same as the military
people. We have suffered great loss, but we do not seek any
retribution. Victims should be compensated, but we seek no
revenge . . . we never think about it. People must work harmoniously, all together, whatever their past . . . I feel happy, as
long as I can see the liberty of my country again. We want
peace and harmony restored for our people.108
Tin Oo served for a time as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and
as Defence Minister while Burma was under the rule of General Ne Win.109
Tin Oo used the Four Cuts strategy to wipe out ethnic militias in Rakhine state
and, in the process, destroying Rohingya villages and driving villagers across
the border to then East Pakistan.110 From one perspective, therefore, the
NLD’s approach to retributive justice was a pragmatic one. Attempts to uncover and explain the past would not only have destabilized the political situation, they would have led to uncomfortable questions for some members of
the National League for Democracy. In her famous 1988 speech at Shwedagon Pagoda, given in the wake of the student uprising and its violent suppression by the Tatmadaw, Suu Kyi asked the people to “try to forget what has
already taken place” and “not to lose their affection for the army.”111
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9:rohingya-condemn-recent-u-tin-oos-statement-&catid=141:october-2011&Itemid=2;
Penny Green et al., Genocide Received, Genocide Continues: Myanmar’s Annihilation of
the Rohingya, INT’L STATE CRIME INITIATIVE (Apr. 11, 2018), http://statecrime.org/data/20
18/04/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-II-PUBLISHED-VERSION-revised-compressed.pdf; Andrew Selth, Myanmar’s Armed Forces and the Rohingya Crisis, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Aug.
17, 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/pw140-myanmars-armed-forc
es-and-the-rohingya- crisis.pdf.
111
Aung San Suu Kyi, “Speech to a Mass Rally at the Shwedagon Pagoda”, in FREEDOM
FROM FEAR, supra note 2 (The Shwedagon Pagoda speech, which launched Suu Kyi’s political career, was delivered at a mass rally at the Shwedagon Pagoda. For background information on the 1998 uprising, see RRT Research Response: Myanmar, AUSTL. REFUGEE
REV. TRIBUNAL (July 29, 2009), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f42061b2.html).
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In 1991, Samuel Huntington set out the considerations, which new democratic regimes must take into account in deciding how to address crimes committed by officials of the predecessor regime.112 In Huntington’s view, the
decision to prosecute and punish, or forgive and forget, did not turn on moral
or legal arguments about societal obligations to truth, justice and the rule of
law. Instead, the decision was determined by the nature of the democratisation
process and the distribution of political power during and after transition.
Huntington argued that in circumstances where democratic transformations
were initiated and guided by leaders of the existing authoritarian regime, assurances regarding non-prosecution—amnesties—were essential to prospects
of democratic consolidation. Put simply, no authoritarian leader would enable
transition if they anticipated being prosecuted as a result. Amnesty was the
price of peaceful transformation. Some academics expressed support for
avoiding the issue of accountability during Myanmar’s transition. “Set the
Junta Free,” wrote Ian Holliday and Roman David113
III. TIME, SUFFERING, AND MEMORY
A. Buddhism and Transitional Justice
Implicit in the argument for deferring justice was the understanding that
the preservation and consolidation of democracy required peace and stability.
Development, to improve the health, education, and living standards of the
people, also required peace. Therefore, ran the argument, those who were genuinely interested in protecting human rights must support peace and political
stability at all costs. If justice (in the sense of accountability for past acts of
the military) stood in the way of peace, then justice should be deferred or sacrificed.114 The forward-looking constitutional project of democratic consolidation was pitted against the backward-looking project of retributive justice.

112
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
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See generally Roman David & Ian Holliday, Set the Junta Free: Pre-Transitional
Justice in Myanmar’s Democratisation, 41 AUST’L J. POL. SCI. 91 (2006); Trevor Wilson,
Strategic Choices in Myanmar’s Transition and Myanmar’s National Security Policies, 3
ASIA & PAC. POL’Y STUD. 62 (2016).
114
“Peace or justice” has been called the “devil’s choice” for new transitional governments. LUCIEN HUYSE, YOUNG DEMOCRACIES AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN AMNESTY, TRUTH
COMMISSIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 11–12 (Instituut Recht en Samenleving, 1998); Jose
Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425 (1992)
(referring to “peace or justice” as the “traditional justice dilemma”); Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES xix–xxx (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); see also BERBER
BEVERNAGE, HISTORY, MEMORY, AND STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE 20 (2013) (Bevernage
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Official discourse in the early years of transition sought to emphasise unity
and political progress rather than division and historical grievances. Strengthening institutions was the focus of transition, not punishing individuals.115
Yet, to cast the problem of transitional justice in Myanmar as “peace versus
justice,” the well-known devil’s choice of transitioning countries, would be to
view the issue through too narrow a lens. Suu Kyi’s emphasis on forgiving
and forgetting was consonant with deeply held and widely understood Buddhist understandings about the nature of suffering, time and punishment.116
Like many people in Myanmar, Suu Kyi had suffered grave injustice at the
hands of the military. She spent eighteen years under house arrest, was separated from her children, and endured slander and humiliation. Her husband
died alone in England because the military would not guarantee Suu Kyi’s
entry back into Burma if she left the country to be with him. But for Suu Kyi,
the law of karma was a more appropriate response to suffering than retribution. In The Voice of Hope, she said that Myanmar’s military dictators might
be able to avoid the repercussions of breaking human laws, but that:
They are not above the law of karma, because the law of karma
is actually very scientific. There is always a connection between cause and effect. It’s like the light of a star isn’t it? The
light that we see now was initiated so many light years ago,
but there it is. In science too there can be a seemingly long gap
between cause and effect. But there’s always the connection
between them.117
The Buddhist understanding of time is at odds with the linear conception
of time in Western thought. Western thinking is preoccupied with the future

puts the problem as: “to repair historical injustice and thereby risk social dissent, destabilization, and return of violence; or to aim at a democratic and peaceful present and future
to the ‘disadvantage’ of the victims of a grim past?” Id. at 7); see Juan E. Méndez, In
Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 7 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (to the dilemma as “one of the hardest
choices that any democracy has to make.”).
115
See Pablo De Greiff, Trial and Punishment: Pardon and Oblivion, 22 PHILOS. & SOC.
CRITICISM 93 (1996).
116
See Peter Sagar, Aung San Suu Kyi: The Influence of Buddhism on Her Beliefs and
Actions, A LIVING TRADITION (Aug. 2009), https://www.alivingtradition.org/uploads/1/1/3
/8/11381120/aung_san_suu_kyi.pdf; William McGowan, Aung San Suu Kyi’s Buddhism
Problem, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 17, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/17/aung-san
-suu-kyis-buddhism-problem/; Aung San Suu Kyi, My Country and My People, in
FREEDOM FROM FEAR, supra note 2, at 66 (In Suu Kyi’s words, Theravada Buddhism is the
“one single factor which has had the most influence on Burmese culture and civilization”);
MELFORD E. SPIRO, ANTHROPOLOGICAL OTHER OR BURMESE BROTHER?: STUDIES IN
CULTURAL ANALYSIS 75 (1992).
117
Suu Kyi, supra note 111, at 87.
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(a better age that lies ahead) and the past (which provides lessons for the future). The present, however, is devalued in Western thought: “We do not rest
satisfied with the present . . . [f]or the present is generally painful to us.”118
The Buddhist experience of the present is entirely different.119 In Buddhist
philosophy, the past and future do not exist. Nor does the present, in the sense
that Westerners commonly understand it as something distinguished from the
past and future. The Buddhist conception of temporality is a challenge to retributive justice because it sits uneasily with a focus on the past (establishing
guilt) and the future (promoting deterrence).
In Buddhist thought, all that exists is eternity, without an individual fixed
self, an “I”, at the core of it.120 One of the central goals of Buddhism is to
realize that the ego or the self—understood as a stable, localizable, and autonomous instance of control, which governs our decisions—is illusory. The
Buddhist conception of the self presents another challenge to core tenets of
transitional justice because it stands at odds with the individualistic focus of
much Western legal theory about transitional justice (individuals as perpetrators and victims).121 In terms of victims, the claim that transitional justice processes promote healing for individual victims122 is, from a Buddhist perspective, based on a profoundly simplistic view of how psychotherapy works.
Catharsis may have short-term benefits for some, but healing is a long-term,
culturally determined process that involves more than emotional abreaction.
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lives, and thus heal.”); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 4 (2010) (“It is also often suggested
that digging into the truth and giving victims a chance to speak offers a healing or ‘cathartic’ experience”); Reparations, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/o
ur-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (“Symbolic reparations—such as apologies, memorials, and commemorations—can be just as beneficial,
healing, and meaningful as material reparations”); see also Public Hearings: Platforms of
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119

448

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:425

B. Truth
While Buddhism does not countenance retribution, there is a role for
truth.123 In Suu Kyi’s view, “truth and reconciliation go together. Once the
truth has been admitted, forgiveness is far more possible. Denying the truth
will not bring about forgiveness, neither will it dissipate the anger in those
who have suffered.”124 Suu Kyi said that suffering had to be acknowledged:
You can’t just wipe away the past. If you try, there will always
be this ocean of festering resentment within those who have
truly suffered. They will feel that their sufferings have been
pushed aside, as though they’ve suffered for nothing; as
though they’ve undergone torture for nothing; as though their
sons and fathers had died for nothing.125
A decade before transition began, Suu Kyi was asked specifically about a
Truth and Reconciliation Council in Burma. She said:
I think in every country which has undergone the kind of traumatic experience that we have had in Burma, there will be a
need for truth and reconciliation. I don’t think that people will
really thirst for vengeance once they have been given access
to the truth. But the fact that they are denied access to the truth
simply stokes the anger and hatred in them. That their sufferings have not been acknowledged makes people angry. That is
one of the great differences between SLORC and ourselves.
We do not think that there is anything wrong with saying we
made a mistake and that we are sorry.126
Yet once transition was underway, Suu Kyi’s language and actions betrayed profound unease at the prospect of any sustained process of truth-telling—of remembering, mourning, or acknowledging the traumas of the past.
The precarious political balance of power, the complex history implicating
current heroes of democracy, the profoundly Buddhist conceptions of time,
suffering and being, which affected ordinary understandings of appropriate
forms of acknowledgement and redress, augured against the pursuit of truth—
123
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(2018).
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telling processes. Ultimately, Suu Kyi did not make it a condition of her cooperation in the transition that Myanmar’s military rulers acknowledge or
apologize for the years of terror endured by the people. The attitude of many
people in the country was that if Suu Kyi, “Mother Suu,” was content to wait
for acknowledgement of the past, then they too should be content to wait.
C. Burmese Exceptionalism
In relation to long-standing external critics of military rule in Myanmar,
including political leaders in the United States and Great Britain, Suu Kyi reminded them that they could never be as familiar as she was with the particularities of Myanmar’s transition and that it was for the people of Myanmar to
decide what to do about the past.127 This argument was largely accepted by
leaders in the USA, Great Britain and Canada. Suu Kyi’s position was not,
after all, unusual for the leader of a country transitioning from oppression and
civil war. Historically, most countries undergoing transition opt for a combination of “amnesia and amnesty” as the response to a painful past wrought by
violent internal conflict.128 In 1975, Spain made its transition to democracy
with a conscious policy of forgetting;129 twenty years later, the Irish peace
process gave token recognition to the significance of memory and history,
whilst placing greater emphasis on the desirability of “a new beginning”:
The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who
have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best
honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate
ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and
mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.130
Suu Kyi joined the military in constructing a political process of forgetting
rather than remembering.131 Suu Kyi’s aim was to build reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust by means other than grappling with the trauma of a
complex past. The alternative means for achieving important transitional
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goals was to be an intense focus on the rule of law as the new lodestar for
relations between the military, the government, and the people.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
A. The Rule of Law in Myanmar
The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards.132 The rule of law requires fairness in the application of the law, the separation of powers, popular participation in decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal
transparency.133 The rule of law is valued because it positively affects an individual’s ability to live and function in society without fear and with greater
freedom, dignity, and confidence.134 For Aung San Suu Kyi, during the long
years of dictatorship, the rule of law stood in opposition to the arbitrary exercise of state power by the military. Suu Kyi understood the rule of law to mean
the impartial enforcement of just laws, which were enacted with the authority
of a democratically elected legislature and interpreted by an independent judiciary.135 She distinguished the rule of law from law and order: “[t]here is no
intrinsic virtue to law and order unless ‘law’ is equated with justice and ‘order’
132
See Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? And
Who Cares? 50 NOMOS 64 (2010) (defining the rule of law a complex process). The description I provide is an uncontroversial one. It is a distillation of Lon Fuller’s eight characteristics of legal rules, with the addition of “international human rights norms and standards” to signal a “thick” conception of the rule of law—one that requires that the laws
comply with substantive ideals. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); see
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & RONALD DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT:
CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS (2008).
133
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eds., 1987); What is the Rule of Law?, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/wh
at-is-the-rule-of-law/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
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with the discipline of the people satisfied that justice has been done.”136 She
noted that “law as an instrument of state oppression is a familiar feature of
totalitarianism.”137 In speeches and statements she drew on Buddhist concepts
of dhamma—righteousness or virtue—to explain the meaning of the rule of
law.138 Her writing conveys her sensitivity to the debilitating consequences of
being forced to live in continual fear of the arbitrary exercise of power.139 In
Suu Kyi’s view, one of the many damaging effects of fear was that it deformed—“warped”—reason and conscience.140
At the beginning of Myanmar’s democratic transition, the rule of law was
in a state of grave disrepair. In the period from 1962 to 2010, governance in
Burma/Myanmar was characterized by the arbitrary exercise of power, the
extra-judicial and systematic use of violence to suppress dissent, and widespread corruption.141 Part of the military’s strategy of control involved the exercise of random acts of oppression and deliberate violence against the civilian
population in ethnic states and regions.142 It was common for Tatmadaw soldiers to round up men, women and children in entire villages.143 Some of the
men would then be randomly selected, accused (without evidence) of being
collaborators with ethnic insurgents, tortured and killed.144 The purpose was
136
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137
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to dissuade others from collaborating.145 Political opponents of the regime
were commonly arrested, imprisoned and subjected to torture.146 The general
population of Myanmar lived in a continual state of fear.
In democratizing societies, transitional justice measures are held to facilitate adherence to the rule of law by establishing that the law does not exempt
those who wield power (demonstrating the generality of law) and by demonstrating the ways in which legal systems failed to protect the rights of citizens
in the past (providing the basis for future reform).147 Transitional justice processes also often involve vetting and dismissing those who abused their positions, increasing the integrity of rule of law systems.148 The problem for Suu
Kyi and for other transitional leaders was how to signal transformative politics
to a traumatised population in the absence of criminal trials or truth commissions demonstrating the end of arbitrary rule and a commitment to principles
of justice.
B. The Rule of Law During Transition
The rule of law emerged as the standard-bearer for justice in the transitioning regime. After 2012, both the military and Suu Kyi extolled the rule of law
as a panacea for the ongoing abuses of power that accompanied military action
in ethnic conflict zones, and as a remedy for the mistrust that existed between
the military and the people. Instead of grand gestures of justice for historical
wrongs, such as trials or truth commissions, the new order set about building
trust through everyday demonstrations that the military was no longer unaccountable and that public officials were subservient to the law. The new re-
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gime created institutions designed to monitor government behaviour, including a National Human Rights Commission and a Lower House Committee for
the Rule of Law, Peace and Tranquillity,149 and permitted the prosecution of
several low-ranking members of the military.150 In 2016, for example, seven
Burmese soldiers were brought before a military court, charged with the murder of ethnic villagers in Myanmar’s Northern Shan state, and convicted and
sentenced to five years in jail with hard labor.151 Announcing the prosecution,
the Chief of Military Intelligence said that members of the armed forces who
violated military laws and procedures would be prosecuted according to the
rule of law.152
The protest at the Letpadaung copper mine was an early test case for the
rule of law’s potential to bring justice, end impunity, and establish trust between the government and the people. The case concerned land-grabbing, a
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common complaint during the years of military rule.153 In 2010, a company
owned by the military confiscated a large parcel of farmland in the Sagaing
region to develop a copper mine in partnership with a Chinese industrial and
arms manufacturer. Local farmers and Buddhist monks began a peaceful protest on the disputed land, demanding the return of the land and an end to environmentally disastrous copper mining. In the early morning of November
29, 2012, as protesters and their families slept, security forces entered the
campsite and dispersed the protest using teargas, smoke bombs, and fire.154 In
the wake of the incident, President Thein Sein formed a Parliamentary Commission, chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi, to establish the facts and inquire
whether mining should continue. In March 2013, the Commission handed
down its report.155 The report did not recommend the closure of the copper
mine, nor did it expose the perpetrators of the violence carried out on November 29. Instead, it advised protesters to desist and the company to maintain the
environment and provide jobs and education to the local community. In a
meeting with farmers, Suu Kyi said that Myanmar could not afford to shut
down the mine and risk turning away foreign investors, and that in any regard
their protest was illegal: “[Y]ou all have to ask permission from the government if you protest as our country has the rule of law now. Those who do not
respect the rule of law, they could get punished.”156
Distorted understandings of the rule of law were repeated in the years that
followed. From 2012 the rule of law was regularly invoked by the military,
by Aung San Suu Kyi, by the Office of State Counsellor, and by the President’s office, to shut down criticism of the government and the military.157
Colonial era laws such as the Official Secrecy Act and the Unlawful Assembly
Act were used numerous times against citizens and members of community153
Tom Kramer, Ethnic Conflict and Land Rights in Myanmar, 82 SOC. RES. 355 (2015);
Emel Zerrouk & Andreas Neef, The Media Discourse of Land Grabbing and Resistance
During Myanmar’s Legal Reformation: The Monywa Copper Mine, 7 L. & DEV. REV. 275
(2014).
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TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/asia/myanmar-troopsused-phosphorus-on-protesters-lawyers-say.html (“A group of lawyers investigating a violent crackdown in Myanmar in November that left Buddhist monks and villagers with
serious burns contends that the police used white phosphorus, a munition normally reserved
for warfare, to disperse protesters”).
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based organizations.158 In 2014, a team of journalists reported that chemical
weapons were being produced in a secretive army installation in Pakokku
Township.159 The three reporters, the journal’s editor, and its chief executive
officer were charged under the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment with hard labor.160 In January 2015, two Kachin school-teachers, Maran Lu Ra and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, were raped and murdered
in a small village in Shan state.161 The suspected perpetrators were members
of the military’s Light Infantry Battalion 503,162 which had been stationed in
the village at the time of the crimes. Shortly after the discovery of the bodies,
the military published a statement denying military involvement and stating
that the Tatmadaw would take action based on the rule of law against anyone
who alleged soldiers were involved in the crimes.163 The President’s Office
supported the Tatmadaw’s position, claiming that an accusation against an
individual solider was an accusation against the Tatmadaw as an institution,
and warning that the Tatmadaw had a right to defend itself by prosecuting
those who make unfounded accusations.164 The government passed press-related laws, such as the Telecommunications Law, introduced in 2013, which

158
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were used by both the Military and the NLD to stifle criticism of the government on social media.165 The Telecommunications Law was used to prosecute
twenty-five year-old Chaw Sandi Tun, who posted a comment on Facebook
likening the colour of Aung San Suu Kyi’s dress to the colour of the military’s
uniforms.166 Tun was charged with defamation under Article 34(d) of the Act,
which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison.167
A deformed understanding of the rule of law was particularly patent in the
events surrounding the massacre at Inn Dinn. In February 2018, Reuters published a story about a grave containing the bodies of ten Rohingya men, found
in a village in north-western Rakhine state.168 The men had been hacked to
death or shot.169 Witnesses told reporters that soldiers plucked these ten men
at random from among hundreds of men, women, and children who were seeking safety from fighting on a nearby beach.170 In April 2018, seven Tatmadaw
soldiers were convicted of the murders of the men and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment with hard labour. But the two Reuters journalists who investigated the murders were also arrested, charged, and found guilty of breaching

165
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the Official Secrets Act 171 for possessing documents which had been provided
to them by a policeman acting under orders to entrap the journalists.172 The
police officer who revealed the set-up to the court was also detained on
charges of violating the Official Secrets Act and the Police Disciplinary
Act.173 He was sentenced to a year in prison.174 British Ambassador Dan
Chugg, speaking on behalf of EU members, said the verdicts of the journalists
had “dealt a hammer blow for the rule of law.”175
The everyday application of the rule of law could not sustain transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy. Its foundation, shape, and implementation was fundamentally “warped” by a cast of minds formed by decades of oppressive rule, by the absence of any public symbol of disjuncture
with the past, and by a constitution—a founding legal document—which was
unjust, which did not reflect the will of the people, and which was used as a
vehicle for ongoing abuse and impunity. Suu Kyi herself subverted the Constitution by avoiding Article 59(f), which prevents her from becoming President, by engineering her appointment as the Special Counsellor of State, a role
which she said was “above the president.”176 Suu Kyi’s legal advisor, U Ko
Ni, explained the reason why this extra-constitutional role was legitimate:
We cannot talk about the rule of law. Matters relating to rule
of law must be initially enacted fairly and justly by the parliament. Then, all people need to start obeying those laws. The
present constitution is not fair to the people, and so, it has nothing to do with the rule of law.177
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U Ko Ni was assassinated at Yangon airport on January 29, 2017. The
headline in the Myanmar Times read “The Death of the Rule of Law.”178
During the first decade of transition, the rule of law was extolled but its
effects in developing a society where people lived without fear and with
greater freedom, dignity, and confidence were difficult to discern. The decade
was marked by a preoccupation with the rule of law, with deep confusion
about its meaning and application, and ongoing mistrust of the government’s
conception of the rule of law. For most people in Myanmar, including the
country’s leaders, the rule of law was still what those who held power exercised in relation to others who had none. Like concepts such as truth and justice, the rule of law was distorted by the occlusions of history and by the failure to speak the truth about past oppression. These are the circumstances in
which the tensions of transition and shifting possibilities of power give rise to
new acts of barbarism; where the oppressed become the oppressors; where
there is heightened fear and lawlessness; and where ancient grudges break to
new mutiny.
V. THE ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR: BEYOND THE LAW
A. The Rohingya as Outsiders
The early years of transition were marked by deep uncertainty. The old
order was changing. Aung San Suu Kyi, for decades a staunch opponent of
military rule and an icon of democracy, now shared power with the military
and occupied a position that was “above the President.” Increasing freedom
of speech included increasing levels of racially motivated hate speech. Commitments to ending civil war were matched by increasing levels of conflict in
ethnic states. The military acted with a heightened sense of danger from multiple fronts: instability due to new ethnic insurgencies; the potential of losing
power to new political actors; the threat of losing economic wealth to new
mechanisms of oversight. Other actors had new space in which to operate and
new motivation for seeking power. Political actors who had suffered during
the dictatorship, such as the Generation 88 leaders who fought in the 1988
uprising, looked for opportunities to claim their political due; democratic leaders who held power, such as the National League for Democracy and Aung
San Suu Kyi, labored under the weight of expectations. The large diaspora
returned home to find that there was not always room for them in the new
regime. In much of Myanmar, the rule of law failed to constrain the actions of
new and old actors. And there were some areas of the country beyond the

178
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scope of law, vulnerable to extreme political action and reaction. In these areas, the strategy of ruling a line under history, forgiving and forgetting, moving forward, leaving truth for later, and gradually strengthening the rule of
law, came radically undone. The attempted destruction of the country’s archetypal outsider, the Rohingya, was the final result of this.
The Rohingya—identified by their dark skin, Chittagonian dialect, and Islamic faith practices—maintained a precarious existence in Rakhine state, in
north-west Myanmar, for at least 200 years. The Rohingya live mainly in the
north of Rakhine, a religious and ethnic minority among the predominantly
Buddhist population. The history of their presence there is deeply contested.
The Rohingya claim their ancestors lived in Rakhine many centuries before
British colonization. 179 Rakhine Buddhists (and many others in Buddhist majority Myanmar) claim that the British brought the Rohingya to Rakhine from
India during the period of colonial rule.180 Among the Burman majority who
have held power in Myanmar since the end of the Second World War, and
among Rakhine Buddhists, the belief that the Rohingya do not belong in Myanmar and should not be permitted to remain is widely held.181
The question of who belongs in Rakhine and who does not is acute because
of widespread landlessness, and lack of food, healthcare, and basic resources.
Rakhine’s poverty rate is almost double the national rate;182 child mortality is
among the highest in the country;183 immunization coverage is among the lowest;184 adult illiteracy is 50 percent higher than the national average;185 one
third of Rakhine children are underweight, and thirty-eight percent are
stunted. In the North of Rakhine, where the majority of Rohingya live, there
have been multiple outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases.186 When they
can, the people of Rakhine subsist on agriculture and fishing.187 But with a
long coastline along the Bay of Bengal, Rakhine is susceptible to cyclones,
179
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natural disasters, and the effects of climate change. Former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, who was commissioned by the government of Myanmar
to write a report on the problems of Rakhine in the wake of deadly conflict
between Rohingyas and ethnic Rakhine in 2012, identified lack of development and poverty as a major contributing factor to inter-ethnic tension.188
Rakhine is home to other minorities, such as Hindus and Muslims Kamans,
but ethnic Rakhine Buddhists predominate.189 Ethnic Rakhine have long demanded a fairer federal union from the centralist Burman government and the
Arakan Army has pursued this demand with continuous insurgency.190 Ongoing conflict exacerbates poverty and discourages investment, leading to further conflict over scarcity.
The foundational calamity for the Rohingya was British colonial rule. The
Rohingya fought with the British in the Second World War in return for a
promise that when the war ended, the British would create a Muslim National
Area in Northern Arakan.191 The majority of the region’s Buddhists followed
General Aung San and his “thirty comrades” in the Burma Independence
Army (BIA), which fought with the Japanese.192 The Japanese victory over
the British in Burma in 1942 had brutal consequences for the Muslims of Arakan. They were denounced by the BIA as British collaborators and traitors,
and the BIA sought to drive them from the country.193 British victory, the end
of the Second World War, and Burmese independence did not restore land or
property to the returning Muslims of Arakan.194 The Rohingya petitioned unsuccessfully for the creation of an Islamic state and for integration of areas of
Northern Arakan into what was then East Pakistan.195 Until 1961, there was
conflict between Rakhine nationalists, who were pressing for the creation of
their own state within Burma; Muslims, who were also pressing for their own
independent state; and the army of Burma’s first independent government,
which was committed to national unity. Between 1958 and 1961, a series of
ceasefire agreements were signed between the central government and both
the Rakhine nationalists and the Rakhine Muslims.196 The final ceasefire
188
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agreement between the central government and the Muslim guerrillas in
Northern Arakan recognized the “Rohingya” as a separate ethnic group.197
This brief period of peace came to an end with the coup d’état of General
Ne Win in 1962.198 As leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP), Ne Win presided over the drafting of the 1974 Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma,199 which provided for a one‐party
system of government with nominally autonomous states for the non‐Burman
nationalities, including the Rakhine.200 The Rohingya were not recognized.
Ne Win militarized the state under a nationalist ideology of “one blood, one
voice, one command.”201 Ne Win’s regime perpetrated forced relocations of
Muslims, forced labor and severe human rights abuses.202 Again, hundreds of
thousands of Muslims fled the country and some who remained created new
armed resistances, such as the Rohingya Patriotic Front.203 During the next
twenty-six years, while Ne Win pursued a Burmese form of socialism under
one-party military rule, the military attempted to transform Myanmar by purging all forms of pluralism, ensuring the primacy of the Tatmadaw as the only
potent political force responsible for the affairs of the state.204 Buddhism became the military’s lodestar. The military was cleansed of Christian, Jewish,
Muslim, and Hindu officers who refused to convert to Buddhism and the
Tatmadaw was dispatched to suppress by brutal means, ethnic armies in
Christian minority states such as Kachin and Shan.205 A new “purist” Buddhist
ps://www.rohingya.org/the-muslim-rohingya-of-burma/.
197
Id.
198
Konsam Devi, Myanmar Under the Military Rule 1962–1988, 3(10) INT’L RES. J. SOC.
SCI. 46, 46 (2014).
199
Id.
200
There was broad agreement among the “main” ethnic minority groups (Shan, Karen,
Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon, and Arakan communities) concerning the appropriate number
of ethnic satellite states. See BURMA ETHNIC RES. GRP. & FRIEDRICH NAUMANN FOUND.,
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF A HIDDEN WAR: INTERNALLY DISPLACED KAREN IN BURMA 24
(1998), https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs3/Berg-Forgotten_Victims.pdf (“This 1974
constitution in no way satisfied the demands of the ethnic nationalities with regard to demarcation or powers, but it did express the broad agreement concerning the ethno-political
framework of Burma.”).
201
Martin Smith, Army Politics as a Historical Legacy: The Experience of Burma, in
POLITICAL ARMIES: THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 273
(Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt eds., 2002).
202
See IFFM 2018, supra note 29, paras 72–73.
203
Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh—Historical Background,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www. hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2020).
204
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Program Party
Government to Eradicate Internal Economic Impediments, 11 SOUTH EAST ASIA RES. 5, 35
(2003).
205
Maung Zarni et al., An Evolution of Rohingya Persecution in Myanmar: From Strategic Embrace to Genocide, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.mei.edu/publ

462

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:425

vision prevailed.206 In relation to the Rohingya, the overarching strategy of
the military was to degrade life to the point where it could no longer be endured: to deny food, work, the ability to marry within the law, and register the
birth of their children.207 The aim was to force the Rohingya into ghettos to
die of disease and hunger, or to force them to leave the country and flee into
Bangladesh, or into Thailand and Malaysia via the desperate passage across
the Andaman Sea, or through the jungle at the hands of people smugglers.208
The military’s strategy included intermittent operations so brutal and terrorizing that the Rohingya historically fled.209 In 1978, the military commenced military operation Ye The Ha, designed to flush out insurgents and
their sympathizers.210 Simultaneously, they carried out a census operation,
Naga Min, to check identity papers.211 In Muslim villages, these operations
were accompanied by rape, murder, the destruction of mosques and the confiscation of identity papers.212 200,000 Rohingya fled across the border to
Bangladesh while state media propaganda blamed the trouble on Muslim extremists.213 In 1982 the Ne Win government passed the Citizenship Law,
which restricted full citizenship to “national” ethnic groups such as Burmans,
Mons or Rakhines.214 The Rohingya were not listed among the ethnic groups
who were considered to belong in Burma.215 In 1991–92, following the Burmese army’s suppression of the democracy uprising in 1988, the military’s
attitude towards Muslims in Rakhine hardened.216 More army and local border
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police, known as “Na Ka Sa,” were deployed in the Northern border region.217
There were forced relocations and confiscation of Muslim land and property
and accompanying brutality, including murder, rape and forced labor.218
Large numbers of Rohingya died during this period and 250,000 Muslims
from Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung fled into the Cox’s Bazar area
of Bangladesh.219
B. Citizenship and the 2008 Constitution
The 2008 Constitution was specifically drafted to exclude the Rohingya
by reserving important rights for citizens only.220 The constitutional prohibition on discrimination on the basis of race, birth, religion and other characteristics, the right to freedom of religion, the right to freedom of expression and
assembly, the right to freedom of movement, the right to education and the
right to enterprise, are all explicitly reserved only for citizens.221 Policies, laws
and regulations that deliberately target the Rohingya, such as the regulation in
Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships that restricts Muslim families to having only two children, are not unconstitutional.222 In 2015, the national parliament passed the “Four Race and Religion Protection Laws,”223 which gives
217
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local authorities the power to monitor and control the marriage, reproductive
and religious practices of target minority groups.224 Given the past practice of
authorities in Rakhine state, which was to apply laws and regulations in ways
that severely discriminated against the Rohingya,225 there were well-founded
fears that the Four Laws presaged an intensification of efforts to marginalize
and debase the Rohingya.226 In 2014, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation
of Human Rights in Myanmar argued that:
Given the gross and systematic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of
accountability, there is an indication that those human rights
violations are the result of a state policy that involves authorities in the executive, military, and judiciary at all levels.227
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C. The Path to Genocide
In June 2012, President Thein Sein announced a state of emergency in
Rakhine state and brought the area under military control.228 This followed
widespread rioting after a group of Buddhist villagers detained a bus and
killed ten Muslim passengers as reprisal for the alleged rape of a Buddhist
woman.229 Military intervention fueled rather than diminished the violence,
with reports that police and paramilitary forces opened fire on Muslims as
Buddhist villagers burnt their homes.230 140,000 people were left homeless,
and the army forcibly relocated many more Rohingya into overcrowded
camps, restricting their movement, access to medical care, work, and food.231
President Thein Sein’s public statement was that the “only solution” lay in the
expulsion of the Rohingya to other countries or to camps overseen by
UNHCR.232 In the wake of the violence, Aung San Suu Kyi appointed former
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to establish an advisory commission made
up of domestic and international members, charged with developing recommendation to improve conditions for all in Rakhine State.233
In October 2016, the government of Myanmar announced that the military
was commencing what it called a “clearance operation” in response to an attack by armed insurgents on three border guard posts.234 The area was sealed
off, movement within the area was restricted, and humanitarian agencies were
denied access.235 The operation lasted from October 9, 2016 until February 9,
2017.236 During that period, according to a report published by the United
228
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Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, government forces
carried out a series of atrocities against local Muslim populations.237 These
included: the burning and looting of Rohingya villages; the murder of Rohingya men, women, and children; summary execution of imams, religious
scholars and community leaders; and rape and torture.238 The military used
helicopters to fire bullets and drop grenades on villagers, and shot people as
they were working on their farms, shopping in markets, or fishing.239 Hundreds of thousands of villagers fled across the border to Bangladesh. In an
open letter to the President of the Security Council, a group of Nobel Peace
laureates said that “human tragedy amounting to ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity is unfolding in Myanmar.”240 One Rohingya said, “[n]ow is
the worst it has ever been . . . . We have heard from our grandparents that there
were bad things happening in the past too, but never like this.”241 In 2016, the
High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a report to the Human Rights
Council which suggested there had been a widespread or systematic attack
against the Rohingya, which if established by a court of law would indicate
the possible commission of crimes against humanity.242
This report was followed, in February 2017, by another report by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights into the government’s clearance operation
in Northern Rakhine state after October 9, 2016.243 This report was carried out
with a rigor and thoroughness designed to counter accusations of fabrication.244 Investigators, who were denied access to Northern Rakhine State,
gathered evidence from 220 refugees who had fled across the border in Bangladesh.245 They adopted the methods and techniques of a criminal investigation. They gathered first- hand testimony from men, women, and children in
eight different refugee camps, who had been fired upon by helicopters, driven
237
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from their villages, raped, burnt, and beaten.246 Investigators photographed
the bullet and knife wounds, burns, and injuries that the assaults had left.247
The evidence from all the camps was qualitatively and quantitatively consistent.248 The Report stated:
The testimonies gathered by the team—the killing of babies,
toddlers, children, women and elderly; opening fire at people
fleeing; burning of entire villages; massive detention; massive
and systematic rape and sexual violence; deliberate destruction
of food and sources of food—speak volumes of the apparent
disregard by Tatmadaw and BGP officers that operate in the
lockdown zone for international human rights law, in particular the total disdain for the right to life of Rohingyas.249
Suu Kyi responded: “The Myanmar government is responding to the issue
of Rakhine state based on the principles of the rule of law.”250
In the wake of this report, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, together with human
rights advocates, urged the Human Rights Council to establish a Commission
of Inquiry (COI) to investigate allegations of violations, identify the perpetrators and determine whether international crimes had taken place.251 Within the
Human Rights Council, however, there was only sufficient support for establishing a Fact-Finding Mission.252 On 24 March 2017, a UN Fact-Finding
Mission was created with a mandate to investigate reports “with a view to
ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims.”253 Five
months later, the military launched a second and more ferocious reprisal in
246
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Rakhine state.254 The Mission provided its Final Report to the Human Rights
Council in September 2018. The Report called for the investigation and prosecution of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing, and his top military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes.255
Within Myanmar, vitriol against the Rohingya intensified and support for
Aung San Suu Kyi and the military strengthened. In October 2016, the staterun newspaper, the Global New Light of Myanmar, ran an editorial about the
danger posed by terrorists. The writer used the analogy of fleas: a flea by itself
is harmless, but together, they could amass enough force to cause chaos and
destruction. In a similar way, argued the editorial, Muslim terrorists were trying to disintegrate the unity and strength of the country by waging armed attacks, spreading rumours and performing subversive activities. The editorial
urged the people to be wary of the dangers of “detestable human fleas.”256
Senior Burmese diplomats were reported describing the Rohingya as “ugly as
ogres” because of their “dark brown” complexions and other racial features.257
A Burmese commander gave an interview to the BBC in which he denied the
possibility that the Tatmadaw was raping ethnic Rohingya because Rohingya
women were “too dirty” to rape.258 In October 2017, one of the country’s most
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revered monks, Sitagu Sayadaw, addressed a gathering of military officers,
where he told a parable implying that non-Buddhists were sub-human beings,
so killing them was not a sin.259
What happened to the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 can be read as an extension and intensification of military conduct that had been practiced in 1948,
1962, and 1992. What ended as genocide was the continuation of a historical
pattern in which the military acted in a precarious political context to address
“the Rohingya problem,” using extreme violence, supported by a powerful
logic of nationalism and religious fervor. In January 2017, a YouTube video
was released on Facebook showing Burmese policemen at work in Ko Tan
Kauk village in Northern Rakhine State.260 The video, taken by a member of
the police, shows fellow policemen carrying out a military operation in a Rohingya village.261 The men and boys of the village are seated in rows on the
ground, their hands behind their heads and their knees bent, while a group of
policemen beat them with sticks and kick them in the back and in the face.262
At the very beginning of the video a young boy, appearing to be no more than
7 or 8 years old, is kicked in the back as he moves towards the lines of men,
his hands raised above his head.263 There is no sense of crisis or urgency in
the actions of the police: they carry out the beatings in a casual, matter-of-fact
way. Some of the policemen are aware that they are being filmed: one lights
a cigarette and stares straight into the camera.264 The complacency of the perpetrators, the casual violence, and the air of routine brutality were striking.265
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In 2019, the Mission reported to the Human Rights Council that it had reasonable grounds to conclude that the State’s genocidal intent against the Rohingya had strengthened and that “there is a serious risk that genocidal actions
may occur or recur.”266
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CALL TO MEMORY
In recent years, scholars have interrogated the “memory assumption” axiomatic in writing about transitional justice. They have argued that there is no
rule that a violent past must be addressed in any process of transition; that a
therapeutic understanding of memory is not applicable in all cultural contexts;
that acknowledging and addressing past wrongs is not necessary and can indeed undercut prospects for democratic consolidation.267 Critics of transitional justice have argued that there is limited potential for court processes in
the aftermath of conflict and authoritarian rule to deter wrongdoing, enhance
social cohesion, produce reliable historical records about the context of international crimes, or promote healing for victims.268 The backdrop to Myanmar’s transformation from military rule to a limited form of constitutional democracy in the period 2008–2018 was a complex, fragile politics of transition
where there was deep cultural ambivalence about pursuing accountability for
past wrongs.269 In the particular circumstances of Myanmar, there appeared to
be strong reasons for deferring serious discussion about transitional justice.
Nonetheless, the failure of Myanmar’s leaders to provide even the most
basic recognition of historical wrongs as part of the transition to democracy
contributed to the carrying out of acts of mass atrocity against the Rohingya.
This is because “forgetting” significantly contributed to a political culture
where the identity and humanity of individual victims was not recognised and
where pre-existing patterns of oppressive rule were able to continue, unpunctuated by new understandings about the nature of the rule of law. The direct
consequence of this was the willingness of the military to carry out—and the
preparedness of many people in the country to accept—the commission of
acts that are in likelihood genocide. I have shown that there was a historical
precedent for forgetting as a political strategy in the transition from colonialism. It was a strategy made politically palatable (and plausible to the outside
world) by the dynamics of the military-led transformation of power (Section
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I). It was supported by deep cultural beliefs and understandings about the nature of suffering, time, and identity, held by many in the majority Buddhist
population (Section II). The attempt to signal a new order of accountability by
focusing on the rule of law could not shift past patterns of oppression and
abuse (Section III). The result of all this was that the generals of the Tatmadaw
had the freedom to dispose of “the Rohingya problem” with a fierceness and
urgency that included atrocity (Section IV). If I am correct and the decision to
pursue a policy of forgetting contributed to the genocide of the Rohingya, then
Myanmar stands as a compelling case for remembering.
The aim of any process of remembering—whether through a trial or truth
commission—is to prompt the kind of complex national deliberation that can
build a foundation for values of toleration, moderation, and civil respect.270
Transitional justice processes and institutions are inevitably, regardless of
their shortcomings, sites for discussion about the moral and legal worth of
individual human beings and reflections about fundamental social and political values. They are discursive phenomena about moral principles and the humanity of victims, perpetrators, bystanders, and political leaders: public theatres where complex deliberations about culpability, responsibility, state
violence, and retribution play out.271 Processes for remembering also require
us to compile detailed knowledge about other lives and about the indignities,
abuses, and atrocities that bring lives to an end. At the highest point this enables an act of imagination, an invitation to a question that is fundamental to
building social cohesion in deeply divided societies: “How would I feel if this
were done to me?” In The Warrior’s Honor, Michael Ignatieff asserts that in
ethnic conflict our ability to perceive separate human beings is replaced by an
insistence on seeing groups.272 It was not by chance that the generals of the
Tatmadaw, in their battles with ethnic insurgents, deliberately deployed soldiers to regions within the country that were foreign to them: where they did
not speak the language and could not understand the customs. The generals
were correct in assuming that it would be easier for soldiers to carry out terrible acts against people with whom they felt no familiarity.
After the Second World War, the archdeacon of Rangoon, George Appleton, argued against the prosecution of Aung San. He said: “In Burma people
do not generally think in terms of justice and reason, but in terms of personalities and relationships.”273 In Appleton’s view there were “racial factors”
involved in the murder of Rashid and he foreshadowed violent reprisals
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against Muslim Indians if the prosecution went ahead.274 The trial of Aung
San, the country’s heroic soldier and statesman, would certainly not have generated closure: its consequences may have been dramatic and bloody. But a
trial would have painted the story of Aung San and his victim Abdul Rashid
in all its complex moral hues and prompted a set of questions that would have
reverberated through the pages of Myanmar’s troubled history: Do the exigencies of war justify torture and atrocity? Should even the country’s heroes
be held to account when they breach fundamental laws of humanity? What
value should be placed on individual life? What does it mean to respect the
dignity of a human being, whether they are Muslim, or Christian, or Buddhist?
At the core of my argument in this Article is the centrality of discussion of
controversial views about the moral autonomy of the individual in the face of
everyday calculations of politics and pragmatism and the role legal processes
can play in provoking this discussion.
As I write this Conclusion, the International Criminal Court has confirmed
it has jurisdiction to consider the situation in Rakhine state even though Myanmar is not a party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court.275 This
is because one of the crimes Myanmar is alleged to have committed is the
crime against humanity of deportation, partially carried out in the territory of
Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a party to the statute of the International Criminal
Court. In a statement rejecting the decision, a spokesperson for the government of Myanmar said that the ruling on jurisdiction was “the result of faulty
procedure and is of dubious legal merit.”276 Without domestic participation or
internal legitimacy, it seems unlikely that the circuitous ICC process to securing jurisdiction will encourage civil dissensus in Myanmar, promote reasoned
debate about the events in Rakhine state, or further the internalization of
norms relating to justice and reason. But, in the absence of other forums for
acknowledging the victims of administrative massacre in Myanmar, the ICC
processes may yet stand as a fragile point of remembering—of resistance to
the conclusion that the individual victim is “alone . . . outside history . . . nonexistent.”277
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